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Theodor W. Adorno’s Criticism of the German 
Concept of Bildung 
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The question of how to conduct oneself in the world is arguably 
as old as mankind itself. Ancient Greek philosophy, namely the 
sophists, identified a problem which shaped the world since it 
was first articulated – the negotiation of internal truth and 
external application. While neither can truly guide one’s way – 
epistemological relativism and ethical utilitarianism await at 
the extrema – dialogue of all kinds seems to be a way to prevent 
the drift and shift towards these extremes. After having framed 
the philosophical problem, this paper will exemplarily examine 
Germany’s concept of Bildung with regard to these extremes. 
The analysis will focus on the end of the 19th century (fin-de-
siècle) as this has been the phase of Bildung which can, at least in 
part, be held accountable for the horrors of the 20th century. 
Bildung was and still is a central aspect of German culture and 
has been the matter of analysis and discussion ever since. One 
of the most potent criticisms has been uttered by Theodor W. 
Adorno who analyzed Bildung after the Second World War and 
exemplarily outlined traits of fascist societies. However, 
Adorno was also influenced by the zeitgeist and did not grasp 
the problem at the deepest possible level of analysis. Based on 
but not limited to the intellectual accounts of Theodor W. 
Adorno, it will be tried to identify commonalities among 
totalitarian systems and reconnect these with the 
aforementioned philosophical problem of ethical utilitarianism 
and epistemological relativism.   
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Introduction 
One of philosophy’s oldest and most central questions is about 
the conduct of life. More specifically, philosophy reflects on the 
constituents of the Good Life. This question is frequently debated 
in different disciplines and traditions and does not seem to lose 
its appeal to academic as well as non-academic audiences. The 
tremendous success of Jordan B. Peterson’s book 12 Rules for 
Lifei (2018), in which he outlines and explains principles how to 
conduct oneself in the world, supports this hypothesis. 
However, the questions on how to conduct oneself in the world, 
ergo which standards to follow, which norms to live by, and 
what goals to strive for are much older than the recent 
discourse may suggest. Depending on the historical, political, 
and intellectual environments as well as the divergent 
zeitgeists, different ideals have been emphasized. In this 
spectrum of ideals, two extrema can be identified: 
epistemological relativism – which can be understood as the 
internal search for truth – and ethical utilitarianism, the urge for 
real-life application (cf. Böhm, 2010, p. 15). The first part of this 
article will outline key aspects of these philosophical positions 
and provide exemplary cases of their manifestations in different 
areas and disciplines. Further, their co-dependency and on-
going mutual replacement will be discussed. 
While the introspective search for truth as well as the 
outward-oriented application of one’s forces have shaped the 
course of literature, architecture, philosophy, education, 
politics, and a plethora of other disciplines, some real-life 
events’ impacts are so far-reaching in their scope that basic 
propositions of academia and philosophy need to be 
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questioned. One such event was the Holocaust, in which 
industrial-style efficiency, precision, and technology were 
combined with never before seen cruelty and malevolence (cf. 
Frankl, 1977/2019). As a response to the horrors of the early 20th 
century and the Holocaust in particular, Theodor W. Adorno 
re-examined philosophy, culture, and education/self-formation 
(German: Bildungii) and tried to identify central flaws in these. 
Especially the aspect of Bildung is crucial in his analysis as 
Bildung can be considered the intersection of self-cultivation, 
moralization, and acquisition of skills. The lack of the first two 
combined with a highly skilled and technologically advanced 
society led, in part, to the horrors of the 20th century. While 
having been morally corrupted during the National Socialist’s 
era, the concept of Bildung has always been Germany’s genuine 
approach to tackle the question of the Good Life and has 
occupied a central position in public discourse, schools, society 
as well as German philosophy ever since. Bildung works on the 
same question which also occupied the minds of the sophists, 
Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, and the aforementioned Jordan B. Peterson (as well 
as a variety of other thinkers). In his post-War re-examination, 
Theodor W. Adorno criticizes Bildung by introducing a concept 
which he conceptualized as Halbbildung (semi-Bildung) and 
whose emergence he held partially responsible for the 
detrimental actions of the 20th century and beyond. In his 
criticism of Bildung as well as his conceptualization of 
Halbbildung, Adorno picks up and draws upon the 
aforementioned sophists’ argumentation and positions himself 
with regard to the dilemma outlined above. Halbbildung – as 
one case study in which application was emphasized over truth 
– will be outlined and historically framed in the second section 
of the paper.  
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Even though Adorno’s focus was primarily directed at the 
mechanisms which enabled the two World Wars and the 
Holocaust, his theory of Halbbildung primarily focuses on the 
economization of culture, cultural goods, and ultimately 
Bildung. Based on his observations, it can be argued that pure 
rationality – ridded of everything irrational, such as morals, art, 
culture, or the humanities in general – ultimately leads to 
totalitarianism (cf. Woodley, 2010, p. 39). Furthermore, Adorno 
discusses how the economy’s logic – as one of the ultimate 
manifestations of rationality and its preference of 
impact/application over truth – deforms Bildung as well as the 
corresponding institutions. The last section of this article will 
deploy the aforementioned theoretical considerations – 
alongside the exemplary, philosophical case study – to identify 
and present commonalities of totalitarian ideology and revisit 
these by reframing them with the philosophical concepts and 
terminology of this paper.  
 
The Ancient Greek’s Ideals and Dilemmas 
The Ancient Greek philosophers were united in their belief of 
moral as well as practical excellence – a state of being, which 
Aristotle called Eudaimonia (cf. Deci & Ryan, 2008, p. 2). 
Eudaimonia described the most perfect and completely 
balanced out state of an entity – an imagined state of excellence, 
wisdom, and virtuousness. Eudaimonia was considered to be 
the ultimate goal of the individual – sometimes referred to as 
their true nature –, the polis, and the state. Before these insights 
of the Ancient Greek thinkers were turned into common ideals, 
thriving for individual perfection used to be a privilege 
exclusively reserved for the wealthy, powerful, and well-off. 
The Ancient Greek philosophers however transformed it into 
an aim which could be achieved by every individual (cf. Böhm, 
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2010, p. 12). Therefore, the central unit of analysis and target 
group of these considerations used to be the individual as 
“moral value is centered within a person” (Birmingham, 2004, 
p. 316); however, the double-edged nature of virtuousness – 
pending between the internal and external – was also 
considered as “one cannot just be virtuous, one must become 
virtuosity by performing and hence embodying virtuous 
actions in public” (Hawhee, 2002, p. 187). In order to embody 
the spirit of virtuousness to the fullest and to reach one’s true 
nature, the individual had to thrive for theoretical wisdom 
(arête), practical wisdom (phronesis), and technical/creational 
skill (techne) (cf. Nonaka & Toyama, 2007, p. 377/378) – a 
holistic approach of self-cultivation. Further, the different 
variations of wisdom served as a link to connect the individual 
to the wider community as through acting these 
values/wisdoms out (i.e. in the form of speech) “good is 
beyond being” (McGuirk, 2008, p. 170). Therefore, through 
physical, intellectual, and/or verbal actions, values transcend 
the individual and ultimately transform the polis, community, 
or state as a whole which, in turn, also transforms the 
individual – a dialogical relationship between the two, which 
can either be a vicious or virtuous cycle. By linking the 
community and the individual through (articulated or 
otherwise realized) values, a dialogical process of constant 
renewal, feedback, correction and ultimately improvement is 
triggered. This understanding of the relationship of the state – 
or ultimately culture – and the individual also manifests itself 
in Gaddis’ observations as he states that the “Greeks thought of 
culture as character” (Gaddis, 2018, p. 44).    
However, the sophists’ school of thought identified a 
problem related to acted out and/or articulated virtues. The 
problem – yet, also its greatest strength – with the articulated 
word (logos) arises from the fact that it can actually change the 
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world. The dilemma the sophists identified relates to the 
concept of truth and opposes the external (impact on the status 
quo) and internal (quest for truth) direction of truth. Following 
the direction of external-oriented ethical utilitarianism, truth 
would be defined by its potential to reach an “individual’s 
desired end” (Noel, 1999, p. 276); true would be that, which has 
the highest degree of utility for a person or group (cf. Böhm, 
2010, p. 15). The opposing paradigm would be that of inward-
directed search for truth, which – in its most extreme and 
thereby unfortunate realization – could result in 
epistemological relativism (cf. ibid.). In the case of 
epistemological relativism, every aspect of life is questioned 
and devoid of its legitimizing real-life basis as truth is tried to 
be found in the object, action, or thing itself without 
considering externalities as potentially legitimizing factors. As 
nothing can really be considered true if stripped of its real-life 
implications, this approach results in either nihilism or 
relativism; the latter being fostered by the observation that all 
interpretations of the world (all truths so to speak) are of equal 
value – a school of thought which should establish itself 
roughly 2000 years later as branches of postmodernism. 
Ultimately, all human actions and manifestations are pending 
between the extremes of real-life applicability and inward-
directed search for truth.  
The solution to the above outlined dilemma was 
developed by Socrates. According to him, a person could never 
be a sophoi (the knowing) but only the philosophoi (seeker of 
knowledge/truth) – the latter also the name-giver to the 
discipline of philosophy. Further, all efforts to find truth 
through exchange of ideas or dialogue, are only approximations 
of truth. As a result, the process of seeking truth is never 
completed (cf. Böhm, 2010, p. 20). Socrates understood that 
external as well as internal considerations were necessary to 
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find or at least approximate truth. To incorporate both and get 
closer to truth and ultimately wisdom, dialogue became his tool 
of choice. Dialogue or, to frame it more broadly, the exchange 
of ideas and perspectives can take place between individuals, 
between cultures, or between times. Framing history in this 
manner, progress in the sciences, humanities, and arts – as well 
as the intersections of the two – can be read as an on-going 
dialogue with the past, the world, and others attempting to 
improve mankind’s approximation of truth and wisdom.    
As outlined earlier, human’s approximations of truth are 
constantly pending between real-life application and 
introspective self-reflection. The patterns of this process of 
pending – so to speak, an on-going dialogue through the ages – 
can be illustrated in multiple disciplines. Thereby it is no 
coincidence that truth can also be translated as knowledge, 
beauty, and the good in general (cf. Hall, 1980, p. 74). An 
exemplary look into art, literature, intellectual history, or 
architecture shows that every time beauty or aestheticism has 
been overemphasized, the next generation’s reformation 
focused on leaner, cleaner, and more functional designs, 
drawings, or (writing) techniques; in this context the word 
reformation can be read in its fundamental meaning as bringing 
something back into its original or purest form (cf. Liessmann, 
2006, p. 161). Often times, proponents of this kind of 
reformation were in search of a model of perfection and found 
it in the form of Ancient (Greek) architecture, text, thought, or 
art (cf. Lamm, 2005, p. 93; cf. Oelkers, 1999, p. 28). After such a 
reformation, the cleaner, leaner, and more functional school of 
thought/art/writing/design established itself, fossilized, and 
was then replaced by a new paradigm, which – following the 
ideal of constant change between internal/external or 
truth/impact – emphasized the opposing school of thoughtiii.       
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Theodor W. Adorno’s Criticism of the German      
Concept of Bildung 
As outlined earlier, Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy and 
cultural criticism has massively been impacted by the 
observations made during the National Socialist’s dictatorship, 
the Holocaust, and the Second World War. However, his 
cultural criticism focused primarily on the concept of Bildung as 
it was (and still is) a uniquely German concept and subsumes 
questions of self-cultivation, moralization, self-formation, and 
moral education. Furthermore, Bildung and the theorization 
thereof attracted Germany’s most prolific thinkers as the 
accounts of Immanuel Kant, George W. F. Hegel, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, or Friedrich Nietzsche prove. Bildung used to be 
Germany’s unique and highly-valued concept. Therefore, for 
Adorno the root cause of the Holocaust could only be found in 
the failure of Bildung as a generation educated based on the 
ideals of (new) humanism committed mass murder (cf. 
Bulthaup, 2007, p. 60).  
 
German New Humanism and How It Was Corrupted 
Before taking a closer look at Adorno’s contributions and 
criticisms, the history – and with it the ideas, ideals, and 
understandings – of German New Humanism and the failure 
thereof will be briefly outlined as Adorno takes this particular 
school of thought as a starting point for the development of his 
criticism. German New Humanism – primarily shaped by 
Wilhelm von Humboldt and his ideological allies – can be 
considered a re-run of Ancient Greek ideals as it oriented itself 
at the Renaissance and thereby developed a fascination for 
antiquity (cf. Horlacher, 2011, p. 37/38). According to 
Humboldt, each person has forces – these days we would call 
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that potential – inside him- or herself. It is each individual’s 
duty to cultivate and balance these forces by confronting 
artefacts in the real world, such as languages, natural science, or 
history. By confronting these artefacts, the individual grows its 
forces but also changes the world – a growth-driven dialogue 
between the individual and the world emerges (cf. Rieger-
Ladich, 2019, p. 50-51). Contrary to the idea of early 
specialization, Humboldt suggests that these forces need to be 
balanced as a state of harmony is considered desirable. In this 
context, the desired balance or equilibrium can be read as a re-
emergence of the holistic perspective suggested by the Ancient 
Greeks. Just as the Ancient Greek philosophers, Humboldt also 
puts the individual at the center of his analysis and 
(educational) efforts as he “proposed the reduction of state 
power to the barest minimum in order to insure freedom for 
individual self-cultivation […]” (Sorkin, 1983, p. 55). Further, 
New Humanism defines the relationship between the state and 
the individual in Ancient Greek fashion as “the individual and 
the public must be in harmony. Personal morality and politics 
are two sides of the same coin” (Nordenbo, 2002, p. 348) – a re-
run of the culture as character understanding brought forward 
by Gaddis (cf. 2018, p. 44). Based on the aforementioned 
similarities, it could be argued that German New Humanism – 
the school of thought which preceded two World Wars and the 
Holocaust – was tremendously inspired by the ideals of 
antiquity. However, the question remains: How could a system 
which is based on the ideals of emancipation, self-cultivation, 
moralization, and the search for truth result in a society which 
commits mass murder? 
Humboldt was German New Humanisms’ key figure as 
he contributed central ideas and paradigms but also realized 
these by designing Prussia’s school system. In its most basic 
realization, Humboldt’s system and ideas can be spotted in 
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Germany’s educational sector until the very day as the 
emergence of Humboldt’s school system temporally coincided 
with the unification of Germany as a nation under Prussian 
leadership. The historical context of creation, alongside the 
educational sector’s advantages, partially explain their 
longevity and continuity as realized in German schools and 
classrooms. One of these advantages was Bildung’s potential to 
unify the, at this point, relatively young German state. At the 
times of unification, Germany was divided among many lines 
and Bildung served as an external demarcation, primarily 
against the courtly and, from the German perspective, highly 
suspicious French culture. Even though Bildung draws from a 
diverse range of intellectual traditions, it was during the time of 
Germany’s unification that Bildung emerged as a uniquely 
German philosophical concept. Simultaneously, the Kaiserreich 
“appeared to be a strange mixture of highly successful capitalist 
industrialization and socio-economic modernization on the one 
hand, and of surviving pre-industrial institutions, power 
relations and cultures on the other” (Kocka, 1988, p. 5; cf. 
Wehler 1973). This kind of internal disruption opened up 
possibilities for the middle classes to rise in social status as well 
as prosperity. This could either be achieved through mercantile 
endeavors or by joining the state administration. For mercantile 
as well as administrative ascension through the ranks, formal 
education in the institutions designed and realized by 
Humboldt seemed essential and Bildung thereby became a tool 
for economic, social, and political advancement of the 
individual. As such, Bildung opened doors for wider parts of 
society which have been closed during aristocratic dominance 
of the state. Thereby, the emerging role of Bildung can also be 
read as the cautious introduction of meritocratic ideals into 
German society. 
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Over time, a new social, political, and economic class 
emerged: The Bildungsbürgertum. This (upper middle) class 
legitimized their success by the efforts they invested into their 
education and the Bildung they received – a meritocratic 
argument. By the end of the 19th century however, the class of 
Bildungsbürger fossilized, abandoned their meritocratic ideals, 
tried to demarcate themselves from others, and were primarily 
occupied with defending their position in society. What used to 
be a dynamic, active, growth-oriented, and risk-taking society 
became a wary, dull, and defensive bunch. Especially the 
abandonment of meritocratic ideals and the overemphasis on 
material wealth led critics, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, at the 
fin-de-siècle to the observation that the “triumph of the middle 
class” and the “crisis of values” are the “the seeds of the 
destruction of European civilization” (Washburn, 2019, p. 173). 
In the same line of argument, he criticized the deformation of 
Bildung as it was merely seen as a tool for economic and 
political gain (cf. Horlacher, 2011, p. 63). The cruel irony of this 
development seems obvious as a generation formally educated 
in institutions inspired by the Ancient Greek ideals of truth and 
wisdom, reduces their education to a tool for monetary gain, 
influence, and power. 
The reasons for wars are always manifold, 
interconnected, and cannot be reduced to a single factor. 
However, one often neglected factor is the fossilization of 
(value) structures and the reduction of concepts and/or 
institutions to a single cause. In this particular case, it is the 
reduction of holistic education/Bildung to a tool for the 
acquisition and protection of material wealth as well as social 
status. In the case of Germany, the concept of Bildung serves as 
a magnifying glass to reconstruct the societal and intellectual 
patterns which led to the horrors of the 20th century as Bildung 
was not just tightly attached to an institution but also to a 
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certain class of people while constituting a core element of the 
German state and society at the time. This omni-presence and 
relevance of Bildung led Theodor W. Adorno to put Bildung at 
the center of his analysis.     
 
Theodor W. Adorno’s Theory of Halbbildung 
Adorno grounds his criticism on the developments, hopes, and 
promises of German New Humanism as the introduction of 
Bildung (and the widespread availability thereof) promised an 
equal, free, and meritocratic society. While some individuals 
got educated/received Bildung and ascended the hierarchies of 
business, administration, or academia, the overarching dynamic 
of the less-privileged versus the privileged remained largely 
intact (cf. Rieger-Ladich, 2019, p. 97). Thereby, it can be argued 
that Bildung only created the illusion of meritocracy and 
convergence (cf. Tischer, 1989, p. 7). The reasoning behind this 
observation is hidden in Adorno’s specific understanding of 
Bildung, which is loosely related to the sophists’ dilemma 
outlined above. Adorno conceptualizes Bildung as an entity 
which – in order to exist – needs to oscillate between the inner 
process of understanding the world and the real-life application 
of Bildung (cf. Adorno, 1959/2003, p. 95) – the re-emergence of 
the sophists’ dilemma with special emphasis on the Socratic 
idea of on-going dialogue between the two extrema. However, 
Adorno’s argumentation for the need of oscillation differs from 
Socrates’ as he adds a Marxist twist to it. If Bildung only focuses 
on the inner workings, the individual closes its eyes for real-life 
injustices and thereby legitimizes these. In the case of German 
New Humanism and beyond, the version of Bildung realized by 
the Bildungsbürgertum focused almost exclusively on the real-
life application, which constitutes the other end of the extrema 
and exemplarily stands for the other side of the sophists’ 
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dilemma. By only focusing on real-life application and impact 
(i.e. the accumulation of wealth and power), this corrupted 
version of Bildung adapted itself to the system in power and 
thereby (in-)directly legitimized it (cf. Adorno, 1959/2003, p. 
104). In order to remain its integrity, Bildung needs to be free-
floating between the poles of application and truth. As soon as 
an institution or state defines Bildung’s aims, declares its 
outcomes, or sets up structures to realize it, Bildung contradicts 
itself. Look at from this perspective, the institutionalization of 
Bildung can thereby be considered Humboldt’s greatest mistake 
even though he “proposed the reduction of state power to the 
barest minimum in order to insure freedom for individual self-
cultivation […]” (Sorkin, 1983, p. 55).      
However, Bildung was not just deformed and corrupted 
by its institutionalization but the institutionalization should 
rather be understood as the manifestation of a larger problem. 
As argued earlier, Bildung is a highly personal process which 
was being turned into an award, a certificate, or a skill. 
Thereby, Bildung turned from an introspective endeavor into a 
signaling device being presented at job interviews or in social 
settings. Adorno argues that the main driver for this 
development – which has started in the late German New 
Humanism phase and was continued in post-War societies – is 
the commodification of Bildung, which is perpetuated by the 
capitalistic system as well as the mass media (cf. Liessmann, 
2006, p. 9) and can be considered a self-reinforcing mechanism. 
The implications of this argument cannot be overestimated: the 
driver of moral corruption, which ultimately contributed to two 
World Wars and a Holocaust, is one of the few aspects which 
survived the wars and was not only continued but also gained 
in relevance and scope.  
For Adorno, the outward-oriented application of Bildung 
has always been associated with the logic of the economy, 
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commerce, and capitalism as these permeate – at least in 
Adorno’s worldview – all levels of analysis. Even though less-
privileged people can go through the motions of experiencing 
Bildung – i.e. reading the same books and watching the same 
movies or theatre plays as the privileged classes – they will, due 
to their lack of economic and cultural capital, never get the 
same in-depth experience out of it (cf. Rieger-Ladich, 2019, p. 
97). Due to Bildung’s potency to open certain opportunities for 
the middle class, Bildung – and culture, which Adorno uses 
almost interchangeably – will eventually be reduced to its mere 
economic value. Following this line of thought, Adorno argues 
that the consumption of cultural artefacts under a capitalistic 
paradigm only allows a shallow experience, an experience 
Adorno coined Halbbildung (semi-Bildung) (cf. Tischer, 1989, p. 
7). By definition, Halbbildung is not the half of the original 
concept but its fiercest antagonist (cf. Gruschka, 2001, p. 30) as 
culture and Bildung are consumed with the sole intention of 
social demarcation, bravado, and intention to signal belonging 
to an assumed to be prestigious group (cf. Adorno, 1959/2003, 
p. 115; Gruschka, 2001, p. 18) – the ultimate opposite of 
Bildung’s original intentions. 
According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the capitalistic 
mode of operation deforms Bildung and culture alike and 
degrades cultural productions to amusement, which ultimately 
intents an emerging degree of conformity among citizen and 
producers of culture alike (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno, 
1944/2008, p. 153). If reduced to their economic value and/or 
operating under a capitalistic paradigm, culture and Bildung 
turn themselves into propaganda of the, at that moment, 
dominant worldview. As stated, Adorno argues that capitalism 
and the related concepts can be considered the dominant 
paradigm of the past as well as the present. The omni-presence 
and longevity of capitalistic ideology – it was the only ideology 
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which survived two World Wars and in fact thrived after them 
– and its power to engage in and permeate almost all areas of 
life made Adorno “abandon[ed] the hope that education for 
humanity […] could retain its normative power in our time” 
(Lovlie & Standish, 2002, p. 317). 
 
Conclusion and Reflection on the Nature of Totalitarian 
Systems 
Every journey or endeavor – may it be personal, political, 
spiritual, or intellectual, just to name a few – starts with two 
consecutive questions: Where do I/we go to and, after the first 
question has been answered, how do I/we get there? The 
question concerning the destination is value-driven as the aim 
should reflect one’s idea of the highest possible good. Thereby, 
the choice of destination is (or should be) primarily guided by 
one’s idea of arête. As argued earlier, all attempts to thrive 
towards arête are solely approximations. Approximations, by 
their very nature, involve uncertainty and require constant 
reflection and revision; the moral compass can only provide a 
general direction while the person in charge has to decide how 
to get around the immediate hurdles and obstacles. The second 
question – how do I/we get there? – is a question related to 
procedures, tools, and approaches as application is at its very 
core. While the question of what constitutes a worthwhile 
destination can never be ultimately answered, the question of 
how to get somewhere can be answered, at least for a certain 
temporal-spatial point of reference. The question of destination 
requires arête (wisdom) while the second is a combination of 
phronesis (practical wisdom) and techne (technical skill). In case 
that the two dimensions of ideals and realized procedures are 
aligned and directed into the same (or similar) direction, the 
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person, group, community, or state is on its way towards 
Eudaimonia.  
Adorno’s analysis of German society prior to the World 
Wars and beyond has shown that one key problem of culture 
and Bildung has been its deformation by the surrounding 
economic system and workings. Under a capitalistic 
framework, the consumption of culture can only result in 
Halbbildung. In case that individuals and societies adopt this 
framework and adjust their deeds, lives, and institutions 
accordingly, both will end up cleansed of meaning and moral 
guidance, yet they will be highly functional in realizing their 
aims – phronesis and techne without arête to guide them. At this 
point, all it needs is a detrimental idea or destructive ideology 
to take over such societies. Adorno’s analysis stops there. The 
same holds true for Critical Theory and Marxist’s approaches as 
they primarily criticize capitalism and the economic logic as the 
root cause of evil (cf. Purvis & Hunt, 1993, p. 477). However, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, who foresaw many of the horrors of the 
20th century, argues that these horrors were not caused by the 
moral deformation provided through capitalism but by an 
overemphasize of rationality itself. Arguing from Nietzsche’s 
point of view, the lack of morals, beliefs, and ethics – which 
ultimately caused the two wars and the Holocaust – stem from 
mankind’s over-rationalization. Famously, Nietzsche states that 
mankind has killed God with the help of rationality, science, 
and technology (cf. Cybulska, 2016, p. 196). Following 
Nietzsche’s line of reasoning, science and technology murdered 
introspection and made moral guidance obsolete as even these 
questions were reduced to a matter of scientific realizability. It 
can be argued that not capitalism deformed Bildung and 
ultimately led to fascism but the victory of rationality ridded of 
morals – capitalism being one manifestation thereof – over 
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subjective introspection, personal doubt/insecurity, and the 
desire to find truth.  
Exposed in such fashion and without moral defense, 
societies all across Europe – instead of thriving for wisdom – 
fell for simple and all-encompassing answers presented by 
totalitarianism. Further, due to the lack of belief, doubt, and 
reflection of morals and morality, human capacity for evil could 
fully unfold multiplied by the power of technology. Contrary to 
Adorno’s analysis, these evils were not limited to capitalistic 
societies: Stalin’s, Mao’s, and Pol Pot’s dictatorships (and their 
measures) killed approximately more than 100 million people 
in the 20th century (cf. Phillips 2018). These were countries 
which actively opposed capitalism, yet they all emphasized 
rationality, efficiency, and exhibited a lack of – what Richard 
Feynman called – productive doubt (cf. 2005, p. 28). Therefore, 
the question must be asked: What are the underlying 
similarities of Mao’s China, Stalin’s Russia, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, 
and Hitler’s Germany?  
On the most abstract level, totalitarian societies have in 
common that the question of moral destination is no longer 
asked. Their aims are set in stone as their ideologyiv provides 
the blueprint for all decisions. If (Western) civilization is based 
on the Ancient Greek philosophical ideas outlined above and 
societies generate progress through discourse and dialogue of 
ideas, then totalitarianism can be considered the “reversal by 
which progress turned against itself” (Sauer, 1967, p. 405). 
Totalitarian societies abandoned the idea of approximating 
arête; totalitarian ideologies assume that they know arête as their 
ideology does not leave room for any kind of doubt. They are, 
as the label totalitarian indicates, total, all-encompassing, and 
complete. As soon as the aim or destination is clarified, all other 
aspects are degraded to matters of technicalities. This could be 
one reason why totalitarianism – independent of its ideological 
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positioning – is highly compatible with all tool-like disciplines, 
such as the sciences or economics (cf. Sauer, 1967, p. 405). 
Further, this could explain the observation that totalitarian 
dictatorships operate with such efficiency as outlined by Victor 
Frankl (2019/1977) in his accounts of the Holocaust. In their 
very nature, sciences and economics solve problems, are highly 
output-oriented, deliver quantifiable results, and only need a 
direction/aim to work towards (cf. Wolin 2015). On the 
contrary, the arts, humanities but also religion are about 
introspection, deliver far less quantifiable outputs, and their 
results cannot be categorized as right or wrong but should 
rather be regarded a matter of perspective. But, if done with the 
necessary degree of seriousness, the arts, humanities, and 
religion can chip in some much-needed wisdom and serve as a 
moral corrective. However, if the arts and humanities submit to 
a predefined (political) aim and operate with certainty (which, 
by definition, they cannot), they become propaganda (cf. 
Arnold, 2003).  
Almost all totalitarian systems have in common that they 
operate with certainty as they assume to know (with certainty) 
the cause of any problem at all times. As the alleged truth has 
been found, the totalitarian ideology is then perpetuated 
without question. Ideologies have an agenda, which is based on 
a rationale. This agenda is then carried it out with hyper-
efficiency – an uninformed and unwise understanding of 
rationale and rationality as totalitarianism actively avoids 
dialogue with doubt-creating and/or truth-seeking disciplines.      
Truth needs tools to be unfolded in the real world and 
tools require guidance to direct them towards the right purpose. 
Both extrema, truth and application, need each other. This 
holds true for the individual as well as society as a whole. 
Following Isaiah Berlin’s differentiation, a good ruler/system 
requires hedgehogs – people with long-term vision/aims 
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(referred to by some as arête) – as well as foxes, people who can 
solve the day-to-day problems with their practical as well as 
technical wisdom (cf. Gaddis, 2018); basically, the healthy 
mixture of arête, techne, and phronesis which can be considered a 
key feature of the functional individual, group, community, 
and ultimately state. By cultivating this equilibrium of the 
different forms of wisdom, neither perspective – the rather 
truth-seeking or the application-oriented one – can exercise too 
much authority in a given problem. The Ancient Greeks knew 
that self-cultivation requires both of these extrema as they 
incorporated the fine arts and rhetorical training as well as 
physical education and technical skills in their version of 
education aiming at a balanced human being. This idea was 
later adopted by Humboldt and, through him, found its way 
into the German school system as well as German (higher) 
education. Based on the Ancient Greek’s as well as the 
Humboldtian understanding of self-cultivation and Bildung, 
most universities are designed as campuses – the architectural 
manifestation that humanities, arts, and science need to co-exist 
while allowing active dialogue among the disciplines and the 
involved individuals. Even though the economy and capitalism 
– as one proponent of rational disciplines – are currently 
governing and structuring huge parts of the world, the truth-
seeking disciplines should not forget their task of creating 
uncertainty by asking the right kind of questions and chipping 
in some much-needed wisdom by enlarging society’s 
perspective.   
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i It can be observed that the genre of self-aid books – and genres related, 
such as self-improvement or self-help books – have had a mass appeal in 
the 20th century and beyond. From Dale Carnegie’s How to Win Friends and 
Influence People (1956) to Anthony Robbins Awaken the Giant Within (1991), 
the demand for literature of these kinds seems to be increasing over time. 
For the introduction, Jordan B. Peterson was chosen as a reference as he is 
the latest and currently most successful, international author of this genre. 
ii As shown elsewhere (cf. Vogt/Neuhaus, 2021), Bildung is distinctively 
different in its direction, history, and outlook from the global discourse of 
education. Simultaneously, translation as well as incorporation into the 
global discourse seems to be impossible. Therefore, I will use the German 
word Bildung throughout the text. 
iii The author acknowledges that, over time, the paradigms decrease in 
amplitude as each paradigm is a comment on the prior and thereby 
incorporates aspects of the prior. One reason for that could be that we, as 
a society, gradually improved our approximation of truth and thereby the 
follow-up school of thought does not need to correct everything but only 
certain aspects of the prior school of thought. Further, it can be observed 
that the life-cycle of a paradigm, today these would be labeled as trends, 
decreases. 
iv Purvis/Hunt (1993, p. 477) differentiate between „positive“ and 
“negative ideology”, the first being the creation of social consciousness 
(i.e. class consciousness), the latter being marked as “distorted thought” 
(read as: distorted from reality). In this paper, the concept of ideology is 
exclusively understood as what Purvis & Hunt would call “negative 
ideology”. 
